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Part Performance In Ohio
Ohio General Code Sections 8617 to 8621 are patterned after
the original English Statute of Frauds.' The purpose behind such
a statute is to prevent mistakes, frauds, and perjuries by barring
actions based on certain important types of contracts which are not
in writing. The sections of the code herein considered do not de-
clare a contract to be a complete nullity merely because it is not
in writing. The words "No action shall be brought" are considered
to be a rule of evidence, not a prohibition against the making of oral
transactions. 2
If the drafters of these statutes had gone one step further and
declared that no such contract could be made by parol it is pos-
sible that there would be no mitigating doctrine known as part per-
formance. But because the statute denies only the cause of action
and leaves the contract between the parties otherwise intact, the
courts of England and nearly all the courts in this country have
been loathe to apply the statute in all its harshness. 3 The doctrine
of part performance is the well-known device used by these courts
to preclude the use of the Statute of Frauds as an instrument of
fraud rather than as a preventive.
The theory behind the doctrine of part performance is that one
who has permitted another to perform acts or expend large amounts
of money on the faith of a parol agreement, or who accepts the bene-
fit of the other's part performance for which the party performing
cannot be adequately compensated in damages, is not permitted to
assert the Statute of Frauds.
It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss the doctrine
of part performance in its entirety. Instead an effort will be made
(1) to show the confusion which surrounded its development in
Ohio, in terms of the applicability of the doctrine at law and in
equity, and (2) to analyze briefly a few of the Ohio decisions as
to what constitutes part performance.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DocTRNE
Historically, the doctrine was not recognized at law.4 The law
courts could only bow before the plain meaning of the statute, and
nothing could satisfy the statute but a writing. Courts of equity,
on the other hand, would not allow a person who had partially per-
formed under an oral contract to be defrauded by the defense of
I STAT. 29 CAR. II, c. 3 (1677).
2 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PEIFORUA CE OF COmACTS 181 (3rd ed. 1926).
3 Id. at 182.
4 Franklin v. Matoa Gold Mining Co., 158 Fed. 941 (8th Cir. 1907); Montuori
v. Bailen, 290 Mass. 72, 194 N.E. 714 (1935); White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59,
143 SE. 552 (1928).
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the Statute of Frauds. In these courts it was held that the promisor
was estopped from setting up this defense if such a fraud would be
the result.5 It is for this reason that it is said that the contract is
taken out of the statute, rather than saying that the statute is com-
plied with.6
But at an early date considerable confusion arose in Ohio as
to whether the doctrine might also be applicable at law. The case
of Wilbur v. Paine7 was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,
wherein the plaintiff, in order to establish his title, was forced to
rely on the doctrine of part performance. Without discussing the
applicability of this doctrine in an action at law, the court found
sufficient performance and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
The idea that part performance could be used in an action at
law was against the weight of authority elsewhere,8 but at least
there was an "Ohio rule" to be followed.9 This rule lasted until
1901 when Kling v. Bordner10 was decided. This was another ac-
tion at law and in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus it is stated,
"The doctrine of part performance obtains in equity only, and does
not avail to render a contract which is void by the statute because
unwritten or unsigned, capable of being sued on in a court of law."
Nowhere in the case is there any mention of Wilbur v. Paine.
When the question was next raised by the case of La Bounty v.
Brumbaclc, an action at law, the court had an opportunity to over-
rule or to at least distinguish either Wilbur v. Paine or the Bordner
case. It did neither, however, but instead stated that the plea of
part performance was just as effectual in an action at law at that
time as it was in Wilbur v. Paine. The court admitted that this
was against the weight of authority, but it did not admit that there
were contrary decisions by the same court. At this point there was
justifiable confusion among the Ohio attorneys. 2
In Hodges v. Ettinger,"3 decided in 1934, the court handed down
what should have been a very important decision. Kling v. Bordner
and La Bounty v. Brumback were both considered and each was
modified. The La Bounty case, allowing the use of part performance
S Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1A. 2d 146
(1938).
6 Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Idaho 102, 231 Pac. 708 (1925).
71 Ohio 251 (1824).
SFreeport v. Bartol, 3 Me. 340 (1825); Kidder v. Hunt, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 328
(1823).
9 Grant v. Ramsey, 7 Ohio St. 157 (1857); Speck v. Waggoner, 3 Ohio 292
(1827).
10 65 Ohio St. 86, 61 N.E. 148 (1901).
1126 Ohio St. 96, 184 N.E. 5 (1933).
12 8 U. oF Cnv. L. REv. 190, 192 (1934).
13127 Ohio St 460, 189 N. R 113 (1934).
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in an action at law, was held to be too broad, and conversely, the
Kling case, denying its use at law, was considered too restricting.
Judge Stephenson pointed out the fact that whether or not the
doctrine could be used at law or only in equity was no longer very
material since the distinction between the two had been abolished
and both legal and equitable causes could be joined in the same
action.14 The court then laid down a rule which was intended to
strike a medium between the cases it had modified. It was well
stated in the following syllabus:
The doctrine of part performance can be invoked, to take a
case out of the statute of frauds in Ohio only in cases in-
volving the sale or leasing of real estate, wherein there has
been a delivery of possession of the real estate in question,
and in settlements made upon consideration of marriage,
followed by actual marriage. Such doctrine of part per-
formance has no place in the law governing contracts for
personal services. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule of this case would have limited the use of part per-
formance to cases based on specified transactions, regardless of
whether the action were at law or in equity. If the supreme court
had considered itself limited by this decision the applicability of
part performance in Ohio would have been substantially different
from what it is today. But that Hodges v. Ettinger does not serve
as a limitation in all cases is shown by two recent decisions.
The cases of Snyder v. Warde, Adm'x1 s and Goetx v. Jacobsl6
are similar in that each involved an oral promise to convey real
property in return for personal services rendered by the promisee
until the death of the promisor. In each case the plaintiff asked for
specific performance and relied on the doctrine of part performance
to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. In the Goetz case
specific performance was granted. In the Snyder case the decree
was denied, but only because the court found that the plaintiff's
performance was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
part performance doctrine.
In neither case was Hodges v. Ettinger distinguished, in spite
of the fact that (1) the cases involved contracts for personal serv-
ices, and (2) in the Snyder case there was no possession. If the
Hodges case stood alone it could be argued that the reference to
"contracts for personal services" was meant to exclude only those
contracts calling for personal services for monetary consideration,
but this argument is weakened by the language of the Snyder case
itself. The court there cited Hodges v. Ettinger as authority for the
proposition that payment of consideration, even when the consid-
14 Omo GEN. CODE § 11238.
S 51 Ohio St. 426, 88 N.E. 2d 489 (1949).
1659 Ohio L. Abs. 25 (1949), Ohio Bar, March 5, 1951.
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eration consists of the rendition of personal services, could not con-
stitute sufficient part performance.17 The court seemingly rec-
ognized the Hodges case, but went on to cite two older Ohio cases
to the effect that if the services rendered were not compensable in
damages, specific performance could be granted.1 8 The case turned
on the fact that the services were compensable. The court did not
consider itself limited by the Hodges case.
The Snyder case involved a promise to devise real property in
exchange for personal services. Such a contract is within the in-
tendment of the words, "sale... of real estate," 19 but it should be
remembered that the Hodges case qualifies the above words by
adding, "wherein there has been a delivery of possession of the
real estate in question . . ." In the Snyder case there was no
possession of the type usually required to take a contract out of
the Statute. 0
It is not suggested that Hodges v. Ettinger should have been
followed. The rule of that case would have denied the use of the
part performance doctrine in cases where its use is perhaps more
beneficial than in any other situation, i.e., an oral promise to deed
or devise real property in exchange for personal services. The re-
quirement of a delivery of possession would work a great hard-
ship in a case where the plaintiff had performed to his detriment
but had never received possession of the premises. The application
of the part performance doctrine to cases like Snyder v. Warde and
Goetz v. Jacobs is in accordance with the purpose of the doctrine,
which is to prevent the defense of the Statute of Frauds from
working a fraud upon someone who has changed his position by
performing under an oral contract.
It is the inconsistency of the cases since Wilbur v. Paine that
casts doubt upon the problem. The court has followed a zig-zag
pattern which provided authority for the advocates of opposite
views, seeming to ignore rather than to overrule or distinguish its
prior decisions. Even if the cases ignored are implicity overruled,
the frequency with which the rules are changed tends to weaken
the value of precedent in this field of law.
WHAT CONSTITUTES PART PRFoRMANcE
The obvious purpose behind the Statute of Frauds is the pre-
vention of frauds; but to allow the statute to be pleaded as a de-
fense to all actions based on oral contracts within the Statute of
17151 Ohio St. 426, 434, 86 N.E. 2d 489 (1949).
18Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588, 144 N. E. 715 (1924); Shahan v.
Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25, 26 N.E. 222 (1891).
19 Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 AUt. 15 (1893); Shahan v. Swan, supra
note 18.20 Wood v. Thornly, 58 MI1. 464 (1871).
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Frauds would often result in the perpetration, rather than the pre-
vention, of a fraud. It is generally agreed that this is the justification
for the existence of the doctrine of part performance. Mere proof
of the contract the plaintiff seeks to enforce is never sufficient to
take it out of the statute because the statute assumes the existence
of a contract. Even proof that the defendant will be unjustly en-
riched if the contract is not enforced is not enough to justify a de-
cree of specific performance.2 ' The plaintiff who seeks specific per-
formance of an oral contract must show that he has performed un-
der the contract, and that because he has performed only the remedy
of specific enforcement will furnish adequate relief.22 He must
show that he will be defrauded if the agreement is not enforced.23
The application of this policy to a given fact situation is well
exemplified by three recent Ohio cases. In Snyder v. Warde,
Adm'x.2 4 the plaintiff's husband had deserted her and her two small
children. In order to support them she advertised for a position as
a housekeeper. Harper responded to her advertisement and em-
ployed her at $40 per month plus room and board for her and the
children. Her services included general housework, chauffeuring,
secretarial work assisting Harper in his business, and miscellane-
ous tasks of a personal nature. Harper became very fond of the
family. They ate at a common table. Harper gave the children spend-
ing money and made certain that they all attended Sunday school.
He often spoke of his plans for the children's futures, which in-
cluded a plan for sending the boy to a private school. About a year
after plaintiff was employed, Harper told her that he would devise
one-half of his real property to her if she continued in his service
until his death. Plaintiff did remain in his employ, but Harper
died intestate. Plaintiff's action was for specific performance
against the administratrix of Harper's estate, and was based on her
part performance. The court of appeals reversed the court of com-
mon pleas and gave judgment for the plaintiff, but the Ohio Su-
preme Court reversed on the ground that there was not sufficient
part performance to justify enforcement of the oral contract. The
court analyzed in detail the services rendered by the plaintiff and
found that even though they were varied and numerous they were
all compensable in money. The fourth paragraph of the syllabus
states the theory of the case:
"Ordinary services to be non-compensable from a pecuniary
standpoint, generally, must be such as involve a detriment or sacri-
Z1 Andrews v. Charon, 289 Mass. 1, 193 N.E. 737 (1935).
22 Corlin v. Bacon, 322 Mo. 435,16 S.W. 2d 46 (1929); Armstrong v. Katten-
horn, 11 Ohio 265 (1842).
23 Wflbur v. Paine 1 Ohio 251 (1824).
24 151 Ohio St. 426, 86 N. R 2d 489 (1949).
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ice upon the part of the one rendering them, motivated by senti-
ment rather than expectation of payment."
A more recent case is Goetz v. Jacobs. 2S In this case an elderly
woman was suffering from an incurable illness and could find no
one to give her the assistance she needed. She and her husband
prevailed upon the husband's niece to live with them and perform
nursing and housekeeping services. The niece and her husband had
to sell their own house and with their children move into the house
of the elderly couple. The only consideration for this work and
sacrifice was the oral promise by the old man that he would convey
to them his real property. The plaintiffs were put into possession,
the elderly couple retaining only two rooms in the house, but the
old man died before the deed was given. In an action for specific
performance there was a judgment for defendant, but the, court of
appeals reversed. The latter court held that the services rendered
by plaintiffs were not compensable in money, and therefore specific
performance was necessary.
Turning first to the facts of the two cases, it is easy to see
why a distinction was made between them as to the compensability
of the services. In the Snyder case the services were all of a type
that are performed every day by thousands of persons for monetary
compensation. That the services were compensable is evidenced
by the fact that plaintiff accepted the job on a salary basis. It was
not until later that the promise to devise was made, and plaintiff
continued to receive her salary.
Commenting upon the fact that a feeling of friendship develop-
ed between Harper and the family, Judge Stewart said, "We know
of no rule by which it is necessary for an employer and employee
to dislike or hate each other." Something more than friendship
between the parties, therefore, is needed to make services non-
compensable.
The element missing in the Snyder case was found in the Goetz
case. Here was more than a friendship developing between strang-
ers. In this case a close relative had given nursing care and com-
fort to an old woman during her illness. The type of services ren-
dered under such circumstances can never be correctly measured
in dollars and cents. This view is shared by the majority of courts
in this country, but it has not always been the rule in Ohio.2 6
The significance of the non-compensable character of the serv-
ices rendered is obvious. If they are not compensable, and if specific
performance is denied, the court will be allowing the Statute of
Frauds to work a fraud upon the performer. Therefore, when
courts speak in terms of compensability they are merely following
2S 59 Ohio L Abs. 25 (1949).
26Kl:ing v. Bordner, supra note 10.
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the usual limitation on the specific performance of contracts with-
in the Statute of Frauds, i.e., they should not be enforced unless a
refusal to do so will operate as a fraud upon the plaintiff.
Another justification for the distinction between the two cases
can be found in the requirement that the services rendered must
be referable to the contract. There is a much stronger inference
that the services in the Goetz case are referable to the contract
claimed than there is in the case in which the plaintiff merely con-
tinued in her employment at the same salary after the promise was
made. In neither case is this element discussed, but the require-
ment exists in Ohio as elsewhere.27
Thus it would seem that on the basis of services alone the dis-
tinction between the Snyder and the Goetz cases is well-drawn. But
there is still another feature that serves to strengthen these hold-
ings. The element of possession was lacking in the Snyder case
(where specific performance was denied) but present in Goetz v.
Jacobs. In each case the promisee and the promisor lived together
in the house which was to be devised or conveyed, but in the
Snyder case the house was still under the dominion of the promisor.
The plaintiff had moved into the house as a servant, and her po-
sition in the household had not changed after the oral contract to
devise was made. It is generally held that a mere continuance of
a possession taken under another contract is not sufficient per-
formance of the contract sued upon.28 The plaintiffs in the Goetz
case, however, were the dominant tenants. The aged couple re-
mained in the house only because that was part of the contract.
The plaintiffs' possession was as complete as possible under the
contract and that is all that can be expected. 29
The type of possession found in the Goetz case could in itself
justify enforcement of the contract because the plaintiffs had
changed their whole mode of living in order to take possession.
Most courts say that possession, if combined with some additional
element, such as the making of improvements,30 will constitute part
performance. Some courts say that possession alone is enough 31
The usual justification for this latter view is that if the contract is
not enforced the plaintiff in possession will be a trespasser.32 How-
ever, a leading case in this field has held that a contract within the
Statute of Frauds, even if not enforced, is a license to enter and
27Shahan v. Swan, supra note 18; Woods v. Johnson, 226 Mich. 172, 253
N. W. 257 (1934).
2 8 Anson v. Townsend, 73 Cal. 415, 15 Pac. 49 (1887); Myers v. Croswvell,
45 Ohio St 543,15 N.E. 866 (1888).
2 9 Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. .811, 99 N. W. 837 (1904).
30Whitney v. Hay, 181 U.S. 77 (1901).
3 1 Bradley v. Loveday, 98 Conn. 315, 319 At. 147 (1922).
32 Eastburn v. Wheeler, 23 Ind. 305 (1864).
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a defense to an action of trespass.33 To hold in all cases that pos-
session alone or even possession combined with some other act is
ipso facto part performance would seem to be a departure from
the fraud theory on which the equity jurisdiction is based. Never-
theless there are Ohio cases holding that possession alone is
enough.34
The case of Tier v. Singrey3s was an action for specific per-
formance of an oral contract for the sale of land. The plaintiff was
a tenant in one of defendant's houses. When plaintiff paid his rent
for a certain period, the defendant offered to sell him the house in
which he lived and one other. Plaintiff accepted the offer and (1)
made a down payment on the purchase price, (2) received back
the rent he had just paid in advance, and (3) told the other tenant
that he, the plaintiff, would collect the rent from then on. The
plaintiff contended that if the contract was not enforced he would
be greatly damaged because of the loss of his bargain, the value
of the property being much greater than the contract price. Judge
Matthias, in holding that specific performance should have been
denied, stated that neither the loss of plaintiff's bargain nor his per-
formance under the contract constituted a fraud upon him. Noth-
ing that had transpired had changed the plaintiff's position to such
an extent that money damages would not adequately compensate
him. The significance of the case lies in the fact that the court re-
lied heavily on two legal encyclopedias as authority for the hold-
ing that nothing short of a fraud upon the plaintiff should induce
a court to grant specific performance of a contract within the
Statute of Frauds.
Whether or not equity will specifically enforce a contract with-
in the Ohio Statute of Frauds depends principally on how far the
plaintiff has changed his position by performing under the contract.
If he has performed to such an extent that he cannot be adequately
compensated in damages, specific performance will probably be
granted. This is in accordance with the idea that if the performer
will be defrauded by a refusal to enforce the contract, specific per-
formance should be granted. The fraud theory of part performance
is the theory of the Ohio courts, even though they often speak in
terms of compensability. The cases holding that possession is in
itself sufficient partial performance are an exception to this rule,
but it would seem that the reasoning of the present court will soon
eliminate this exception.
Frank E. Kane
33 Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 (1869).
34Waggoner v. Speck, supra note 9; Kemp v. Feldman, 84 Ohio App. 154,
81 N.E. 2d 319 (1948).
3S154 Ohio St. 521 (1951), Ohio Bar, February 19, 1951.
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